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The extent of informed consent
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA, and Laurence B. McCullough, PhD, Houston, TexI never encourage deceit and falsehood, especially if you have
got a bad memory.
Abraham Lincoln
During an urgent aneurysmectomy to treat im-
pending rupture in an 86-year-old man, C. Atlas, a
medical student, applied too much pressure when re-
tracting the bowel, or the retractor was improperly
padded, which created a 4-cm tear in the splenic hilum.
The repair was complex but was completed satisfacto-
rily, and the spleen was salvaged. The patient’s elderly
wife is very upset by her husband’s sudden illness.
Among their adult children, one is a dermatologist and
another is an attorney. Which is the best course of
action to take?
A. Do not disclose the tear because there are likely to be no
permanent consequences.
B. Provide a detailed description of the tear and exact
circumstances of how it happened to the patient’s family
and to the patient when he has recovered.
C. Provide a description of the tear that does not include
the student’s participation to the patient’s family and to
the patient when he has recovered.
D. Disclose only to the patient’s wife that the operation
involved unforeseen complications but that the opera-
tion was successful.
E. Disclose to the family and patient only that the opera-
tion involved unforeseen complications but that the
operation was successful.
Informed consent has become the “central dogma” of
surgical ethics. Knowledge about the therapy originates
with the surgeon, flows to the patient, and there becomes
the basis for initiating therapy, never the other way around.
The direction of this process will never change: ethical
retroviruses don’t exist. Provision of full disclosure to pa-
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professional integrity.1 Giving truthful information for an
unbiased decision shows respect for the autonomy of an-
other person, without which much of the underpinnings of
modern medical ethics would invalidate.
Simple consent was born in the courtroom of Judge
Benjamin Cardozo in 1914 when he ruled that the patients
must give permission to allow treatment.2 Later the con-
cept evolved beyond simple permission into requiring that
enough information must be given to allow the patient to
make a reasoned decision about all available therapeutic op-
tions, including having nothing done. Thus began the ebb of
autonomy from the surgeon to the patient, and because
beneficence—the mandate to heal—was unchanged, the be-
neficence/patient autonomy conflict began.
The present status of conventional informed consent is
explicit; it is a necessary process of honest disclosure about
a particular patient’s medical treatment starting with the
surgeon/patient agreement to treat and ending when the
patient is discharged from care. It entails giving the patient
all the information needed to exert control over what part
of the therapy being recommended they want,3 being made
aware of significant events in the operating room,4 and receiv-
ing candid updates throughout the follow-up period.5
No surgeon wants to be sued, lose the patient’s confi-
dence, or endure the discomfiture of admitting errors; all
are among the distinct dangers of full disclosure in cases
such as this. Some of these concerns focus on protecting the
patient (losing the patient’s confidence) and the rest on
protecting the surgeon. However, the spirit of patient
autonomy has ethically and legally replaced paternalism in
surgery, creating obligations of disclosure that should not
be limited by the self-interests of surgeons when error
occurs.2 Indeed, the process of adequately acquainting
patients preoperatively with their disease, treatment op-
tions, and their likely outcomes—known as informed
consent—has become an ethical “standard of care.”3
In practice, the informed consent process appears to have
become bureaucratized. Among surgeons who have adopted
this approach to informed consent, most considerations focus
on the brief preoperative meeting when the contractual signa-
ture legally authorizing therapy is obtained. This bureaucratic
approach to informed consent creates a trap: losing sight of
the need to continue the informed consent process through-
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formed consent require that the process be continued beyond
the episode of obtaining legal consent for treatment. Clinical
challenges remaining to be addressed include the length of
time that candid disclosure should continue and the extent of
information that needs to be disclosed after a surgical proce-
dure has been completed.
The informed consent process therefore begins during the
encounter with the patient for his or her agreement to have
surgery. Mutual decision making by the physician and patient
(or family, when the patient agrees or cannot participate)
about treatment throughout the course of therapy is
grounded in respect for the patient’s right to self-governance
from his or her existence as an independent moral agent,
covered under the term autonomy. Specific to surgical therapy,
respect for patient autonomy is expressed by an effort to
ensure that the patients decide, from an adequate knowledge
base, what is to be done to their bodies.
Kantian ethics demand that one may neither lie nor
deceive, but one may choose to whom the comprehensive
truth is told; this exception cannot apply in the physician-
patient relationship. The physician must help the patient to
understand both what is planned preoperatively and how
treatment is proceeding.
The extent of disclosure is generally determined on the
basis of the physician’s identification of information that
should influence diagnosis, treatment planning, and out-
comes. Disclosing such clinically salient information meets the
reasonable person standard of disclosure, the accepted ethical
standard, and the legal standard in most jurisdictions.6 This
includes knowledge that the average layperson cannot be
expected to have but needs to know to participate meaning-
fully in treatment decisions and planning one’s future. The
reasonable person standard does not require the physician to
give the patient a “mini medical education” or even every-
thing that is known about iatrogenic splenic tears, but patients
should be told about the risks of complications from repairs of
unanticipated operative injuries. Patients should also be spe-
cifically informed if and how trainees will participate in their
treatment preoperatively.7
The application of the reasonable person standard to
the postoperative conversation with the patient should be
guided by the clinical judgment that a 4-cm tear of the
spleen, even when repaired successfully, may result in clin-
ically significant complications such as subsequent bleeding
and abscess. Option A, which otherwise could be used as a
guideline for disclosure, is thus ruled out. Intra-operative
incidents without risk of consequences need no disclosure.
If the patient had agreed to his wife’s involvement in the
decision-making process and there were no previously voiced
limitations of information to other family members, they
should be informed about the complication, its management,
and its clinical implications. When the patient can again func-
tion as the primary decision-maker in his care, he should be
informed in a similarly detailed way about the complications.
The family should be told that the manner of retracting
the spleen to gain exposure resulted in the tear. Because the
fundamental error is uncertain and assuming that the forceexerted on the retractor did not exceed that necessary for
exposure, mention of Mr Atlas’ role is unnecessary; any mem-
ber of the operative team holding that retractor could have
caused the tear. Besides, acknowledgement of Mr Atlas’ role
would add nothing substantial to the patient’s or his family’s
understanding. Option C is thus the appropriate course to
follow.
Option B assumes that the cause of the tear was the
student’s role and that the complication would not have
happened had that student not been involved. But this
assumption is doubtful, eliminating Option B.
Options D and E risk ethically impermissible under-
disclosure because details of the complications, and how
they could affect the postoperative course, are not ex-
plained. Moreover, under-disclosure may be even more
anxiety provoking for the family and patient, mobilizing
fears that the complications were worse than they really
were. It is worth underscoring at this point that the reason-
able person standard, as the benchmark of the informed
consent process, emerged in specific response to a particu-
larly notorious case of physicians choosing not to disclose
unpleasant information that patients actually needed when
selecting therapy—specifically the severe complications of
cobalt radiation therapy in treating breast cancer.8
Surgeons should always keep in mind that a major clinical
purpose of the informed consent process is to forge a strong
and durable therapeutic relationship, starting in the preoper-
ative period and continuing until the patient is fully recovered
and his or her medical care returned to the supervision of the
referring or primary care physician. It’s the best and cheapest
malpractice insurance one can own.9-12 Amen.
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